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OF IMPURE HEARTS AND EMPTY HEADS: A
HIERARCHY OF RULE 11 VIOLATIONS
Mark S. Stein*
I. INTRODUCTION
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prohibits
certain types of litigation misconduct. The Rule's prohibitions
are effected by a certification requirement:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certifi-
cate by the signer that the signer has read the pleading,
motion or other paper; that to the best of the signer's
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reason-
able inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost
of litigation.'
If a lawyer or party violates Rule 11, the court may impose
attorney fee sanctions against him.'
Since 1983, when Rule 11 assumed its present form, it has
been severely criticized. Among the major criticisms of the
Rule are that it deters meritorious filings along with frivolous
© 1991 by Mark S. Stein
* B.A., 1979, University of Illinois at Chicago; J.D., 1983, University of
Michigan; Associate, Cornfield and Feldman, Chicago, IL. The author acknowledg-
es with thanks the comments of Professor Stephen B. Burbank, University of
Pennsylvania Law School.
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
2.
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this
rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose
upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an ap-
propriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred be-
cause of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including
a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id.
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filings; that it causes wasteful "satellite" litigation; and that it
reduces civility in litigation.' Apparently moved by this criti-
cism, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of
the U.S. Judicial Conference determined in 1990 to reconsider
Rule Ii.'
This article examines the prohibitions of Rule 11 to deter-
mine which prohibitions are least necessary and which are
most harmful. For purposes of this article, it is most useful to
consider the Rule as prohibiting three delicts, and as applying
to two of those delicts both a subjective and an objective test.
The three litigation delicts prohibited by Rule 11 are the asser-
tion of a position not well grounded in fact, or a fact-violation;
the assertion of a frivolous legal position, or a law-violation;
and the filing of a paper for an improper purpose, or an im-
proper purpose violation. As to fact-violations and
law-violations, the Rule is violated either by the assertion of a
position in bad faith or the assertion of a position without
"reasonable inquiry."
In Part II of this article, I evaluate the relative necessity of
Rule 1l's prohibitions. I argue that the prohibition against
3. See, e.g., Elson and Rothschild, Rule 11: Objectivity and Competence, 123
F.R.D. 361 (1989); Crosberg, Illusion and Reality in Regulating Lawyer Peiformance:
Rethinking Rule 11, 32 VILL. L. REV. 575 (1987); LaFrance, Federal Rule 11 and
Public Interest Litigation, 22 VAL. U.L. REV. 331 (1988); Nelken, Has the Chancellor
Shot Himself in the Foot? Looking for a Middle Ground on Rule 11 Sanctions, 41
HASTIN;S L.J. 383 (1990); Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11 - Some
'Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 CEO. L.J.
1313 (1986); Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFFALO L. REV. 485
(1989); Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189 (1988); Weiss, A
Practitioner's Commentaty on the Actual Use of Amended Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L.
REV. 23 (1985).
Although much of the commentary on Rule 11 has been negative, some
have expressed more positive views. See, e.g., Miller, The New Certification Standard
Under Rule 11, 130 F.R.D. 479 (1990); Chrein, The Actual Operation of Amended
Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 13 (1985); Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1013 (1988); Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11 - A Closer
Look, 104 F.R.D. 181 (1985).
4. COMMITrEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF T14E JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., CALL FOR COMMENTS, 131 F.R.D. 335 (1990). In late
April, 1991, the advisory committee on civil rules will meet to consider recom-
mending amendments to Rule 11 to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure. "Revisions may be proposed for public comment, or the [advisory]
committee may conclude to recommend no revisions [in 1991]. Or it is possible
that the [advisory] committee may conclude that furither discussions and hearings
are in order." Id. at 345.
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law-violations is less necessary than the prohibitions against
fact-violations and improper purpose violations. I further con-
tend that the reasonable inquiry requirement is less necessary
than the bad-faith standard. In Part III, I demonstrate that
most of the major problems with Rule 11 are a combined re-
sult of the reasonable inquiry requirement and the prohibition
against law-violations. In conclusion, I propose that the reason-
able inquiry requirement be eliminated, at least as to
law-violations.
II. WHICH OF RULE 1 'S PROHIBITIONS ARE LEAST
NECESSARY?
A. Relative Perniciousness of the Three Rule 11 Delicts
The necessity of Rule lI 's various prohibitions is deter-
mined by the perniciousness of the violations prohibited and
by the propensity of lawyers and clients to commit or not to
commit those violations. I will first evaluate the relative perni-
ciousness of the three Rule 11 delicts: the fact-violation, the
law-violation, and the improper purpose violation.
1. Two Types of Fact-Violation
In conducting such an evaluation, it is useful to distin-
guish between two polar types of fact-violations, or positions
not "well grounded in fact." The first type is that in which the
violation is hidden, at least initially, from the non-violator or is
not demonstrable by the non-violator; I will refer to this type
of violation as a hidden fact-violation. The second type is that
in which the violation is both obvious to the non-violator and
demonstrable by him. I will refer to this latter type of violation
as an obvious fact-violation.
Illustrative examples of the hidden fact-violation and obvi-
ous fact-violation are, respectively, Lockette v. American Broad-
casting Companies, Inc.5 and Sergio Estrada Rivera Auto Corp. v.
Kim.6 Lockette was an employment discrimination case under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' Before filing suit,
the plaintiff, Lockette, secretly tape recorded approximately
5. 118 F.R.D. 88 (N.D. I1. 1987).
6. 717 F. Supp. 969 (D. Puerto Rico 1989).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 20 0 0 (eXe-17) (1987).
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ten conversations between himself and his co-workers. The
defendant, ABC, did not learn of the existence of these tapes
until two weeks before trial.
Prior to learning of the tapes, ABC moved for summary
judgment. In opposition to this motion, Lockette and his attor-
ney submitted an affidavit in which Lockette asserted facts
concerning at least one of the taped conversations. On the
basis of these purported facts, which ABC was then powerless
to disprove, the court denied ABC's motion for summary judg-
ment.
When the tapes were disclosed, it became clear that
Lockette lied in his affidavit. At a bench trial that began two
weeks after disclosure of the tapes, the court granted ABC's
motion for involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. The court subsequently granted
ABC's motion for attorney fee sanctions under Rule 11, indi-
cating that sanctions would be imposed against both Lockette
and his attorney.8
In contrast to Lockette, Sergio Estrada9 exemplifies an obvi-
ous fact-violation. Plaintiff Sergio Estrada, an auto dealership,
sued defendants Sang and Helen Kim in the District of Puerto
Rico. Sergio Estrada alleged that it had paid the Kims hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars to secure franchise rights to sell
Hyundai and Kia cars, but that the Kims had failed to secure
the franchise rights and had refused to return the money.
The Kims filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisidiction. In the memorandum supporting their motion, the
Kims claimed, relying on the affidavit of Sang Kim, that Sang
Kim had engaged in "no business whatsoever in the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico . . . for his own personal benefit.""°
In response, Sergio Estrada submitted an avalanche of
documentary evidence detailing Sang Kim's myriad of contacts
with Puerto Rico. All of these contacts were related to Sergio
Estrada's cause of action. The documents submitted by Sergio
Estrada included the Kims' Puerto Rican hotel bills, paid by
Sergio Estrada; a copy of a business card featuring Kim as a
8. Lockette, 118 F.R.D. at 91-92. The court found that Lockette's attorney was
aware of the tapes when he submitted Lockette's affidavit in opposition to ABC's
motion for summary judgment. Id. at 91 n.3.
9. Sergio Estrada, 717 F. Supp. at 969.
10. Id. at 971 (quoting an affidavit sworn to by defendant, Sang Kim).
[Vol. 31396
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Vice-Chairman of Sergio Estrada and listing for Kim both a
New Jersey and a Puerto Rican address; a copy of a company
credit card in Kim's name; and copies of at least nineteen tel-
exes that the Kims had sent to Sergio Estrada in Puerto Rico.
These documents appear to have been in Sergio Estrada's pos-
session; accordingly, it was not difficult for Sergio Estrada to
prove that Sang Kim had sufficient contacts with Puerto Rico
to establish personal jurisdiction.
The court in Sergio Estrada, of course, denied the Kims'
motion to dismiss." It also granted Sergio Estrada's motion
for attorney fee sanctions under Rule 11, ordering that Sang
Kim pay half the fees the plaintiff incurred in opposing the
motion to dismiss, and that Kim's attorneys pay the other half.
A comparison of Lockette and Sergio Estrada reveals two
primary differences between the hidden fact-violation and the
obvious fact-violation. First, a hidden fact-violation may enable
the violator to prevail. It was apparently a fortuity in Lockette
that the defendant discovered the tapes of the conversations
about which the plaintiff had lied. The hidden status of the
tapes led to the denial of the defendant's motion for summary
judgment and could theoretically have led to the defendant's
defeat at trial. In Sergio Estrada, by contrast, the defendants'
obvious fact-violation could not have enabled them to prevail:
the plaintiff had in its possession all the documents necessary
to prove minimum contacts. As the hidden fact-violation has
the potential to sway the result of the case, it poses a far great-
er threat to the non-violator - and to justice - than the obvious
fact-violation.
Not only does the hidden fact-violation pose a greater
threat to the non-violator; it is also likely to impose a greater
burden, in time and money, on the non-violator and on the
justice system. Though a hidden fact-violation may be discov-
ered relatively quickly, it may also be discovered late, as in
Lockette, or not at all. By contrast, an obvious fact-violation is
by hypothesis apparent to the non-violator immediately. The
non-violator should therefore be able to demonstrate the viola-
tion rather easily and quickly.
11. The court also found that Helen Kim had minimum contacts with the
forum. This article does not discuss the minimum contacts issue as to Helen Kim,
as the plaintis evidence was there less overwhelming and thus less illustrative of
an obvious fact-violation.
1991] 397
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All fact-violations are not of the two polar types illustrated
above. Some fall somewhere on a spectrum between the hid-
den fact-violation and the obvious fact-violation, depending on
how hard it is for the non-violator to discover and demonstrate
the violation.'" Nevertheless, it is useful to draw a sharp dis-
tinction between the hidden fact-violation and the obvious
fact-violation because of the light such a distinction will shed
on law-violations and on violations of Rule l's reasonable
inquiry requirement.
2. Law-Violations
It should be readily apparent that all frivolous legal posi-
tions, or law-violations, are closely analogous to one polar type
of fact-violation described above: the obvious fact-violation. A
lawyer may be able to hide the facts, but he will hardly ever be
able to hide the law. If the concept of frivolousness has mean-
ing, a legal position that is truly frivolous will easily be per-
ceived as frivolous by the violator's opponent and by the
judge."8 Thus, for the same reasons set forth above in connec-
tion with the obvious fact- violation, the law-violation will not
enable the violator to prevail on the merits of the papers filed.
It will pose relatively little threat to the non-violator and will
impose relatively little burden on the non-violator or on the
justice system.
An example of a truly frivolous legal position is afforded
12. Notwithstanding Sergio Estrada, 717 F. Supp. at 969, perjury is usually a
hidden fact-violation, even if it concerns a matter about which the non-violator has
knowledge, since it usually is not demonstrable as a violation.
13. Some would argue that the concept of frivolousness has no meaning, that
a judge's decision as to whether a legal position is frivolous is purely subjective.
As applied under Rule 11, the concept of frivolousness accepts that a legal posi-
tion is generally not true or false in the same sense as an assertion of fact.
Nevertheless, the concept of frivolousness posits a sort of continuum, in which
some positions are more correct and some are less correct. At the far end of the
continuum there fall positions that are so incorrect as to be frivolous and
sanctionable. Integral to the concept of frivolousness is the belief that judges and
lawyers can perceive that a position is so incorrect as to be frivolous and
sanctionable, just as they can perceive that an assertion of fact is true or false.
If indeed there were no objective basis for a conclusion of frivolousness,
readily ascertainable by lawyers and judges, then the sanctioning of frivolous legal
positions would make no sense. For purposes of this article, I assume that there
is such an objective basis, but argue that there is even so little point in prohibit-
ing frivolous legal positions, especially those arising from negligence.-
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by Weir v. Lehman Newspapers, Inc. 4 In Weir, the plaintiff al-
leged that the defendant, a private entity, had violated his con-
stitutional right to due process. 5 As the plaintiff did not al-
lege that the defendant's actions constituted state action, the
court had no difficulty in holding that the plaintiff had failed
to state a federal constitutional claim. On the defendant's mo-
tion, the court imposed attorney fee sanctions against the
plaintiff's attorney.
Obviously, the defendant in Weir was never in any danger
of having judgment entered against it on the plaintiffs con-
stitutional claim. It also could not have required much effort
or expense for the defendant to convince the court that a pri-
vate entity is not subject to liability for violations of constitu-
tional due process. Thus, the plaintiff's frivolous claim, while a
violation of Rule 11, was a relatively innocuous one.
Unfortunately, the relative innocuousness of Rule 11 law-
violations has been obscured by the willingness of courts to
impose sanctions against legal positions that are merely wrong
or even against positions that are ultimately determined to be
meritorious. 6 It is therefore no response to the characteriza-
tion of law-violations I have offered to note that in some cases,
lawyers, parties, and judges have expended substantial efforts
in ostensibly demonstrating legal positions to be frivolous, or
that judges have in some cases awarded substantial attorney
fees as a sanction for law-violations. I would argue that such
substantial efforts and substantial awards are more likely evi-
dence that the challenged legal position was not truly frivolous
than they are evidence that it was frivolous but not innocuous.
If a legal argument is truly frivolous, it should not be hard to
defeat.
a. Law-Violations and the Controverted Duty of Candor
Although it is far harder to hide the law than to hide the
facts, lawyers have been sanctioned for attempting to hide the
law, or more accurately for a lack of candor in their character-
14. 105 F.R.D. 574 (D. Colo. 1985).
15. Id. at 575. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged an "unwarranted invasion of
his Constitutional right to freedom of association and right to personal choice in
marital life." Weir; 105 F.R.D. at 575 (quoting plaintiff's complaint).
16. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
1991]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
ization of the law. The most famous case of this kind is Golden
Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.,17 a case that has
aroused considerable controversy."l A review of the issues in
Golden Eagle suggests that certain violations of the controvert-
ed duty of candor - those involving the actual concealment of
relevant authority - may be a greater evil than most law-
violations. However, such a review also confirms the relative
innocuousness of all law-violations as compared to
fact-violations.
Golden Eagle involved a commercial dispute. The defen-
dant, represented by the firm of Kirkland & Ellis, filed a mo-
tion for summary judgment. The district court denied the mo-
tion and imposed sanctions against Kirkland & Ellis.
The district court in Golden Eagle sanctioned Kirkland &
Ellis because it violated a duty of candor that the district court
inferred from Rule 11. The district court found that Kirkland
& Ellis had violated this duty in two ways: by passing off an
argument for the extension of existing law as an argument
founded in existing law and by failing to cite adverse authority.
The district court imposed sanctions even though it deter-
mined that the positions asserted by Kirkland & Ellis were not
frivolous.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Rule 11 contains
neither an argument identification requirement nor a require-
ment that counsel cite relevant authority. Only if the chal-
lenged position is frivolous, the appellate court held, can sanc-
tions be imposed. 9
The appellate court's construction of Rule 11 is convinc-
ing. Nevertheless, the issue for present purposes is not wheth-
er the appellate court correctly construed the Rule, but how
pernicious are the two purported violations - argument mis-
identification and failure to cite adverse authority - found by
the district court.
These two violations actually call for different analyses.
Argument misidentification in itself is no threat to the non-
violator. As long as the violator has not concealed relevant
17. 809 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1987).
18. See Miller, supra note 3, at 491-98 (criticising appellate court's decision).
19. Five Ninth Circuit judges joined in dissent from the court's denial of a
sua sponte request for hearing en bane. Golden Eagle, 809 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1987)
(Noonan, J., dissenting).
400 [Vol. 31
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authority, the non-violator can point out any
mischaracterization of the law to the judge. The judge can
then read the cases for himself and decide which position to
adopt, as did the district court in Golden Eagle. Unless one be-
lieves that certain lawyers have so much credibility that their
mere presence in a case can deprive the judge of his capacity
for independent thought, it is hard to see why one should care
if a lawyer mischaracterizes an argument for the extension of
existing law as an argument founded in existing law.
Indeed, there is an air of unreality about demands that
Rule 11 encompass an argument identification requirement, at
least when such demands are made by judges: judges habitually
announce new principles of law while purporting to stay within
the confines of existing law. One does not even have to look
beyond Golden Eagle for examples of this habit. The district
court in Golden Eagle thought its conclusion that Rule 11 in-
cludes a duty of argument identification and a duty to disclose
adverse authority to be a "settled principl[e]." 0 The appellate
court, however, found the district court's holding to be not
"supported by or consistent with presently controlling
law. ... "21 Judge Noonan, dissenting from the Ninth
Circuit's denial of rehearing en banc in Golden Eagle, in turn ac-
cused the panel in Golden Eagle of writing an opinion that
"contradicts Rule 11. "22 These stark disagreements over the
grounding of the Golden Eagle opinions in existing law form an
ironic counterpoint to the issue of whether Rule 11 includes
an argument identification requirement.2" It is hard to under-
stand why judges, who are supposed to be neutral, should be
allowed greater latitude in expressing their views than lawyers,
who are not supposed to be neutral. In any event, argument
20. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. at 127 (N.D.
Cal 1984), rev'd, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 809 F.2d 584 (9th
Cir. 1987).
21. Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1541.
22. Golden Eagle, 809 F.2d at 586.
23. Another example of the well-worn judicial tendency to present new law as
settled law is J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr.
407 (1979), a decision that figured largely in the Golden Eagle case. In J'Aihr Corp.,
the California Supreme Court effectively overruled, at least in part, its prior
decision in Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17
(1965). It did so without even citing Seely. The district court in Golden Eagle ruled
that defendant's counsel Kirkland & Ellis merited sanctions for relying on Seely
without citingJ'Aire Cop; Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 128-29.
1991]
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misidentification, by itself, is totally innocuous. Strictly speak-
ing, it does not even represent an attempt to hide the law.
Intentional failure to cite relevant authority does represent
an attempt to hide the law. However, in the vast majority of
cases, such an attempt will be unsuccessful. Presumably, what-
ever authority the violator has failed to cite is equally accessi-
ble to the non-violator and to the judge. If the violator know-
ingly fails to cite an authority, the non-violator will usually cite
it, as in fact happened in Golden Eagle.24
Indeed, the only cases in which a failure to cite contrary
authority might be successful are close cases, not those in
which the violator's position is frivolous. It is only in a close
case that obscure authority, not likely to be found by the
non-violator or the judge, might tilt the decision. If it is a Rule
11 violation to conceal authority adverse to a non-frivolous
position, then such a violation may be a greater evil than
law-violations generally. Obviously, however, it will still be a
lesser evil than a fact-violation; in the case of a fact-violation,
the violator's opponent and the judge enjoy far less access to
the knowledge that would defeat the violator's position.
3. Improper Purpose Violations
Let us now turn to Rule ll's third effective prohibition,
the prohibition against filings for an improper purpose. In
practice, this third prohibition tends to overlap one or both of
the first two prohibitions: If a paper is found to be filed for an
improper purpose, it usually also is found to be frivolous in
fact or law. Despite this overlap, however, improper purpose
cases are distinctive. In such cases, the violator generally does
not assert his position solely in order to prevail on the merits
of the paper filed. Rather, the violator expects to receive some
benefit from his violation other than prevailing on the mer-
tS25its.
An example of the improper purpose violation, illustrating
24. 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
25. The meaning of "improper purpose" is not entirely clear; that phrase may
be extended to situations not embraced by the description set forth above. See,
e.g., Golden Eagle, 809 F.2d at 586 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (it is an improper
purpose to mislead the court). Nevertheless, the concept of attempting to obtain a
benefit, other than to prevail on the merits, describes the core meaning of "im-
proper purpose".
[Vol. 31
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its distinctive characteristic, is In re Perez,26 a bankruptcy case.
In Perez, the debtors, Eliscio and Gregoria Perez, filed a peti-
tion under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.27 Since the
debtors had no source of regular income and were unable to
make payments under a Chapter 13 plan, the bankruptcy court
lifted the automatic stay28 and allowed a secured creditor,
Suburban Coastal, to begin foreclosure proceedings against the
debtors' residence.
At this point, the debtors' lawyer voluntarily dismissed
their Chapter 13 case and filed another Chapter 13 petition on
their behalf. The debtors' lawyer knew that his clients were not
qualified to be Chapter 13 debtors; he filed the second peti-
tion solely in order to obtain another automatic stay and there-
by forestall the foreclosure proceedings.
In response to the second Chapter 13 petition, Suburban
Coastal again obtained an order lifting the automatic stay.
Whereupon the debtors' attorney voluntarily dismissed the
second petition and filed yet a third petition, once again seek-
ing to forestall foreclosure proceedings.
On Suburban Coastal's motion, the bankruptcy court im-
posed attorney fee sanctions against the debtors' lawyer under
Rule 11, Bankruptcy Rule 9011 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. It
should be noted that the debtors and their lawyer in Perez had
no hope of prevailing on any of the three Chapter 13 peti-
tions, in the sense of formulating a successful plan. They filed
those petitions solely in order to obtain the benefit of the au-
tomatic stay. Normally, of course, the mere filing of a com-
plaint or petition confers little benefit on the filer. However,
by reason of the automatic stay, a bankruptcy petition does
confer an immediate benefit on the petitioner, whether or not
the petition is successful; it stays creditor action. Thus, the
debtors in Perez could benefit from frivolous papers regardless
of the merits of those papers.
Other examples of improper purpose violations are cases
in which papers are filed in order to obtain an unjustifiable
delay of proceedings2 9 or in order to generate attorney fees
26. 43 B.R. 530 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1984).
27. Id. at 531 (petition filed under 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1307) (West 1982)
("Adjustment of Debts of an Indkidual With Regular Income").
28. The filing of a bankruptcy petition acts as an automatic stay against
creditor action. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (West 1982).
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 ("not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
1991] 403
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for the lawyer filing the papers.3 ° In all such cases, the com-
mon theme is that papers are filed not in order to prevail on
the paper filed, but in order to obtain some other, unjustified
benefit.
Since the improper purpose violator expects to receive a
benefit from his violation, it is fair to assume that at least in
some cases there will be a corresponding detriment to the
violator's opponent. Improper purpose violations can accord-
ingly be quite pernicious. Moreover, if the position asserted
for an improper purpose is a legal position, the assertion of
that position may be an exception to the rule that law-viola-
tions are innocuous.
A comparison of the characteristics of Rule 1l's three
delicts yields the conclusion that fact-violations and improper
purpose violations are more pernicious than law-violations. In
contrast to the other two delicts, the law-violation will generally
impose little threat or burden on the violator's opponent or
the justice system. Among law-violations, those that are assert-
ed for an improper purpose are the most pernicious, followed
by those violations - if indeed they are violations - that involve
the failure to cite adverse authority.
B. Incentives and Disincentives to Commit Bad-Faith Violations
In evaluating the relative necessity of Rule 1l's prohibi-
tions, it is not enough to consider how great an evil each given
violation is. One must also consider to what extent lawyers and
their clients would be inclined, absent Rule 11, to commit or
not to commit the violation. I will first evaluate the incentives
and disincentives bearing on bad-faith violations. I will then
examine the reasonable inquiry requirement and discuss law-
yer inclinations associated with that requirement.
As to bad-faith violations, the incentives and disincentives
of the litigation process mostly parallel the perniciousness of
the violation. Let us assume that a lawyer or client"' knows
harass or to cause unnecessary delay . . . ").
30. United States v. Wright, 667 F. Supp. 1218 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
31. For purposes of this discussion, I assume that a bad-faith violation by a
non-signing client falls within the purview of the Rule even if there is neither bad
faith nor negligence on the part of the signing lawyer. See Eastway Constr. Corp.
v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 569-70. (E.D.N.Y. 1986) [hereinafter,
Eastway III. Compare Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Enteiprises, Inc. __ U.S. _,
[Vol. 31
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that a position he may assert is legally frivolous, not
well-grounded in fact, or would be asserted for an improper
purpose. Given such knowledge, the potential violator will have
the greatest incentive to commit a violation that could enable
him to prevail. The violation that is most likely to enable a
violator to prevail is the hidden fact-violation. Accordingly,
moral scruples aside, the potential violator will have a tremen-
dous incentive to commit this type of violation.
Conversely, the potential violator will usually have a con-
siderable incentive not to commit an obvious fact-violation or a
law-violation. The potential violator will likely know that such
violations, since they promise no benefit, will be a waste of
time and/or money.
The disincentive to commit a law-violation may actually be
even greater than the disincentive to commit an obvious fact-
violation. A lawyer or client may at times not know that the
fact-violation he is preparing to commit is an obvious fact-
violation; he may not know that the poor factual grounding of
his position can easily be proved by the non-violator. Such
confusion is unlikely with respect to law-violations.
1. Incentives to Assert a Frivolous Legal Position
Nevertheless, situations exist where the normal economic
disincentive to commit a knowing law-violation will not apply
or will not have much force. The most important such excep-
tion is where the law-violation is also asserted for an improper
purpose. As noted, improper purpose violations may benefit
59 U.S.L.W. 4144 (1991) (where client actually signs papers, he or she is subject
to the certification standard normally applied to lawyers).
Unfortunately, as noted by the court in Eastway I, the language of Rule 11
suggests that the Rule cannot be violated absent some fault on the part of the
lawyer who signs the paper. Perhaps the Rule should be amended to provide that
the signature of a lawyer is a certificate not only of his good faith, but also of his
client's. One problem with such an amendment is that it could enable courts to
sanction not only the client, but also the lawyer, even if the lawyer was not even
negligent.
Barring amendment, it could be argued that bad faith on the client's part
necessarily means that a paper is filed for an improper purpose, and that the
lawyer's certificate as to the lack of an improper purpose is in the nature of strict
liability. However, one should guard against making the improper purpose clause
of Rule 11 a residual prohibition against all improper conduct not otherwise
prohibited; such an expansive interpretation of the improper purpose clause would
raise due process concerns.
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the violator regardless of the merits of the paper filed. As the
potential violator expects to receive a benefit from an improp-
er purpose violation, he has an incentive to commit such a
violation.
Another exception concerns pro se litigants. A pro se liti-
gant is more likely than a lawyer to assert, knowingly, a
frivolous legal position. First of all, the pro se litigant may real-
ize that controlling law is adverse to him, but may refuse to
accept that law for ideological reasons. Such an ideological
motivation is displayed by tax protesters who continue to as-
sert, with no hope of success, that the income tax system is
unconstitutional. s2
Other reasons why pro se litigants may knowingly assert
hopeless legal positions are that they find the litigation process
to be an empowering experience; they are able to litigate in
forma pauperis without cost to themselves; and they have time
to spend. All of these motivations may describe some pro se
prisoner litigants.
Certain pro se litigants may not have the same incentives as
ordinary lawyers and litigants to avoid the knowing assertion
of frivolous legal arguments. Thus, deterrence may be more
necessary with respect to law-violations committed by certain
pro se litigants than with respect to law-violations generally.
33
A final exception to the disincentive to commit law-viola-
tions concerns the failure to cite adverse authority. As noted
above, such a failure may in rare cases enable the violator to
prevail, though only where the violator's position is not frivo-
lous. If a lawyer believes that adverse authority of which he is
aware may for some reason not be discovered by his opponent
or the judge, he will have an incentive to conceal such authori-
ty. To the extent that Rule 11 prohibits the concealment of
authority adverse to a non-frivolous position, the Rule's deter-
rent force may once again be more necessary with respect to
such concealment than with respect to law-violations generally.
32. In rare instances, ideology may also make lawyers totally heedless of the
law, but this phenomenon is largely restricted to pro se litigants.
33. However, deterrence will still be less necessary for law-violations commit-
ted by pro se litigants than it is for fact-violations: whatever incentives pro se
litigants may have to assert frivolous legal positions, those positions, when assert-
ed, will still be relatively innocuous.
[Vol. 31
HIERACHY OF RULE 11 VIOLATIONS
C. Negligent Violations
As to fact-violations and law-violations, Rule 11 effectively
prohibits both bad-faith and negligence. The prohibition
against negligence is a result of the Rule's requirement of "rea-
sonable inquiry." The reasonable inquiry requirement has been
interpreted somewhat differently with regard to fact-violations
than with regard to law-violations. With regard to
fact-violations, courts have for the most part followed the lan-
guage of the Rule and considered whether the lawyer or party
conducted a reasonable pre-filing inquiry. With regard to
law-violations, courts have generally considered whether the
filer's position is frivolous, regardless of the inquiry actually
conducted by the filer. In this article, the term "reasonable
inquiry requirement" is used, somewhat loosely, to refer both
to the requirement that a filer make reasonable inquiry and to
the requirement, imposed by the courts as to law-violations,
that the filer's papers attain a certain minimum level of
meritousness3 4 Both these requirements have the effect of
prohibiting negligent conduct that would not be prohibited by
a bad-faith standard standing alone.
The reasonable inquiry requirement is less necessary than
the prohibition against bad-faith conduct. This conclusion is
based on an analysis similar to that set forth above with re-
spect to law-violations: Litigation conduct that violates only the
reasonable inquiry requirement is likely to be a lesser evil than
conduct undertaken in bad faith. It is also likely to be subject
to financial deterrence even absent Rule 11.
1. The Incentive to Make Reasonable Inquiry
It cannot be said that a potentially negligent violator has
either an incentive or a disincentive to assert a legally frivolous
position or a position not well grounded in fact. By hypothesis,
the negligent violator does not know that the position he as-
34. Many commentators have decried the tendency of the courts to focus on
.product" rather than pre-filing "conduct" as an unnecessary and harmful depar-
ture from the language and intent of the Rule. See, e.g., Burbank, Rule 11 in
Transition: The Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on Federal Rule of Civil Pm-
cedure 11 at 96-97 (American Judicature Society 1989). 1 agree that focus on
"product" is harmful but suspect that it may be an inevitable result of the objec-
tive standard introduced by the reasonable inquiry requirement.
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serts is frivolous or ill-grounded. However, lawyers do have an
incentive, absent Rule 11, to make a reasonable inquiry into
the law and the facts. Failure to make reasonable inquiry leads
lawyers to assert positions that lose, an outcome lawyers gener-
ally try to avoid.
A lawyer will make some inquiry into the law and facts,
even absent Rule 11, to the extent he believes necessary to
serve his own interest, and that of his client. The reasonable
inquiry requirement imposes on the lawyer an additional duty
of care, not on behalf of the lawyer's client, but on behalf of
the adverse party and the judge. The reasonable inquiry re-
quirement adds yet another layer of financial deterrence to
what the litigation process already provides.
This additional layer may have some benefits, though as
noted below its benefits are usually overstated. But in any
event, the additional deterrence Rule 11 provides against rea-
sonable inquiry violations is less obviously justified than the
deterrent force Rule 11 exerts against bad-faith violations: the
latter type of violation is often encouraged, rather than de-
terred, by the natural incentives of litigation.
2. Negligent Violations are Less Pernicious
It happens, of course, that despite incentives to make rea-
sonable inquiry, including those provided by Rule 11 itself, a
lawyer will negligently assert a frivolous legal position or a po-
sition not well grounded in fact. However, such negligent viola-
tions are generally more innocuous than violations committed
in bad-faith. By definition, the unknowing negligent violation is
committed with no thought by the violator of how likely it is to
further the violator's interest. Consequently, the negligent vio-
lation is less likely than a knowing violation to pose a threat to
the non-violator or to impose much of a burden on him.
a. Negligent Fact-Violations
Negligent violations may be committed as to both law and
facts. A negligent fact-violation is likely to be an obvious
fact-violation - the most innocuous kind of fact-violation. If the
violator could have discovered the groundlessness of his posi-
tion by reasonable inquiry, the non-violator should be able to
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do likewise. Thus, for example, in Danik, Inc. v. Hartmarx Cor-
poration,5 the plaintiff filed a class action antitrust suit with-
out making reasonable inquiry into the defendant's operations.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant allowed only one retail-
er in each metropolitan area to sell its Hart, Schaffner & Marx
line of menswear. In fact, however, as the defendant easily
demonstrated, its Hart, Schaffner & Marx line was sold by
more than one retailer in every metropolitan area except one.
The defendant in Hartmarx sought $61,917.99 in Rule 11
attorney fee sanctions.3 6  The district court awarded
$32,103.78, holding that the defendant's attorneys spent con-
siderable time beyond that necessary to defeat the plaintiff's
complaint. The sum of $32,103.78 may seem to reflect a signif-
icant burden. In the context of class action antitrust actions,
however, it is a trivial burden. An antitrust plaintiff that com-
mitted a hidden fact-violation, enabling it to undertake typical-
ly massive discovery and proceed to a trial on the merits, could
easily force a defendant to pay millions of dollars in attorney
fees and to face the threat of liability in an amount even more
crushing.
A negligent fact-violation will easily be met if it concerns
the non-violator or if it concerns facts equally accessible to
both parties. Moreover, even if a negligent fact-violation con-
cerns the violator's own operations, it is likely to be more in-
nocuous than a knowing violation. The hypothesized lack of
any attempt to hide the facts simply makes it less likely that
they will be hidden.
b. Negligent Law-Violations
Failure to make reasonable inquiry may also, of course,
lead to a law-violation. The innocuousness of law-violations in
general has already been noted. Negligent law-violations are
more innocuous still. By definition, the negligent law-violation
is not committed with any intent of enabling the violator to
prevail or to accomplish some other, possibly improper pur-
pose. It thus is even less likely than the bad-faith law-violation
to pose a threat or impose a burden on the non-violator.
35. 120 F.R.D. 439 (D. D.C. 1988), affid, 875 F.2d 890, affd in pail, rev'd in
part Cooter v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990).
36. HailmarM 110 S. Ct. at 2452.
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As noted above, the law violations that most call for Rule
l's deterrent force are those committed for an improper pur-
pose; those committed by pro se litigants unaffected by the
financial disincentives of the litigation process; and, arguably,
those involving a concealment of adverse authority. All of
these violations are committed in bad faith; they cannot be
committed through mere negligence.
c. Actual Effect of the Reasonable Inquiiy Requirement
Enough of this airy speculation, advocates of the reason-
able inquiry requirement might argue; that requirement has
had a measurable effect on the behavior of lawyers.37 Howev-
er, the effect that has so far been measured is meaningless in
determining the relative necessity of the reasonable inquiry
requirement and is largely meaningless in determining its effi-
cacy.
Empirical studies on the effect of Rule 11 have been per-
formed by the Third Circuit Task Force3 8 and the New York
State Bar Association."9 The Third Circuit Task Force found
that of 426 lawyers responding to a questionnaire,4" 43.5 per-
cent felt that amended Rule 11 had increased their pre-filing
factual inquiry to some extent and 34.6 percent felt that Rule
11 had increased their pre-filing legal inquiry.4 Similarly, the
New York State Bar Association found that of approximately
1,600 lawyers responding to a questionnaire, 2 39.2 percent
believed that their "pre-complaint" factual inquiry had become
more extensive since the 1983 amendments to Rule 11, and
34.6 percent believed that their "pre-complaint" legal inquiry
had become more extensive.4"
37. This position is suggested, though not necessarily advocated, in the Call
for Comments, supra note 4, 131 F.R.D. at 345.
38. Burbank, supra note 34.
39. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL COURTS: SANCTIONS AND
ATTORNEYS' FEES (New York State Bar Ass'n 1987).
40. The questionnaire was sent to 1270 lawyers. Burbank,-supra note 34, at 6.
41. Burbank, supra note 34, at 75-76, 151. The questionnaire actually asked
whether amended Rule 11 had affected the lawyer's practice as to pre-filing legal
and factual inquiry, but one can assume that no lawyer conducted a lesser
pre-filing inquiry as a result of the amended Rule.
42. The questionnaire was sent to 8,000 lawyers; 20% responded. REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 39, at 2.
43. Id. at A3.
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However, the important issue is not whether Rule 11 has
increased pre-filing inquiry, but whether it has lessened the
filing of frivolous papers. The results set forth above do not
even help to answer the latter question; they do not indicate to
what extent the increased pre-filing inquiry prevented frivolous
filings.
Two findings of the Third Circuit Task Force are some-
what more relevant. A total of 22.1 percent of the lawyers re-
sponding to the Task Force questionnaire thought that the
amended Rule caused them to counsel clients not to file com-
plaints, and 14.8 percent thought the amended Rule caused
them to counsel clients not to file other papers." As Profes-
sor Burbank cautions in the Task Force Report, some of the
restraint induced by the amended Rule may represent
over-deterrence of non-frivolous positions rather than deter-
rence of frivolous positions.45 However, even if one were to
assume that most of the papers not filed as a result of the Rule
would have been frivolous, the finding of some restraint by
lawyers still would not say much about the efficacy of the
pre-filing inquiry requirement. One still does not know, from
these results, how often the Rule-induced pre-filing inquiry
leads to the abandonment of positions. Some lawyers, for ex-
ample, may have undertaken an increased pre-filing inquiry in
every case but may have decided not to file a complaint in only
one case.
46
How, then, could one test the efficacy of the pre-filing
inquiry requirement in deterring the filing of frivolous papers?
There obviously could be some difficulty in asking lawyers
whether and how often they have been deterred from filing a
frivolous paper; lawyers may be reluctant to admit to a propen-
44. Burbank, supra note 34, at 75-76, 151.
45. Id. at 84.
46. In a recently published study, Professor Nelken propounded to a sample
of lawyers from the Northern District of California many of the same questions
used in the Third Circuit study. Of 68 lawyers responding to a questionaire, a
total of 33 percent reported that amended Rule 11 had caused them to counsel
clients not to file a complaint and 32 percent said that the amended Rule had
caused them to counsel clients not to file other papers. Nelken, The Impact of
Federal Rule 11 on Lawyers and Judges in the Northern District of California, 74
JUDICATURE 147, 152 (1990). These interesting results are subject to the same com-
ments advanced above with respect to other empirical studies. One does not know
how often Rule-induced pre-filing inquiry causes lawyer restraint, and some report-
ed restraint may represent overdeterrence.,
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sity to file frivolous papers, even if that propensity has not
been realized. However, one could ask the following two ques-
tions: First, in what percentage of all your cases have you con-
ducted an expanded pre-filing inquiry as a result of Rule 11?
Second, in what percentage of your cases have you refrained,
as a result of Rule 11, from asserting a position?
I suspect that a study including these questions would
reveal that the great majority of the increased work performed
as a result of the pre-filing inquiry requirement does not result
in the prevention of frivolous filings. 7 There is a certain iro-
ny in this hypothesized conclusion, as Rule 11 was ostensibly
designed to streamline the litigation process.
If indeed the enhanced pre-filing inquiry resulting from
Rule 11 rarely results in the abandonment of frivolous posi-
tions, it should come as no surprise. The reasonable inquiry
requirement differs from the prohibition against bad-faith fil-
ings in that most of its deterrent force necessarily misses its
target. In most cases, the additional work occasioned by the
pre-filing inquiry requirement Will not achieve the purposes of
the Rule because the paper the lawyer intends to file will not
be frivolous. Even if the paper is frivolous, a generalized
unfocused pre-filing inquiry may not reveal the basis on which
it is frivolous. After all, the lawyer attempting to satisfy the
pre-filing inquiry requirement knows that he has to look for
facts or law that would render his filing baseless, but he does-
n't know what facts or law to look for.
By contrast, the lawyer who considers filing a paper in bad
faith will experience the full deterrent effect of Rule 11. That
deterrent force may still not be enough to deter the bad-faith
filing, but at least it will not be largely dissipated in the man-
ner of the pre-filing inquiry requirement.
In any event, even if it were determined that lawyers do
refrain from asserting a position in a significant percentage of
cases in which they conduct an enhanced pre-filing inquiry, the
reasonable inquiry requirement would still be less necessary
than the prohibition against bad-faith conduct. A reasonable
inquiry violation would still likely be a lesser evil than a
47. One problem that would have to be overcome in such a study is that
lawyers are more likely to remember conducting an expanded pre-filing inquiry if
such an inquiry led them to abandon a position.
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bad-faith violation, and would still be subject to financial deter-
rence even absent Rule 11.
III. WHICH OF RULE 1 I's PROHIBITIONS ARE MOST HARMFUL?
Rule 11, as amended in 1983, has created a number of
problems. In most of these problems one can find, as neces-
sary ingredients, both the reasonable inquiry requirement and
the prohibition against frivolous legal positions. If either of
these ingredients were not present, the problem would largely
disappear.
A. Over-Deterrence
One of the major criticisms of Rule 11 is that it has an
over-deterrent effect, that it causes lawyers to forego not only
frivolous positions, but also potentially meritorious posi-
tions.48 The concept of over-deterrence presupposes that
there is a range of legitimate positions a lawyer can assert, and
that Rule 11 causes him to narrow that range unduly. Obvious-
ly, then, there would be no significant problem of over-deter-
rence were there no reasonable inquiry requirement. Under a
bad-faith standard, lawyers would for the most part feel free to
assert all positions in which they in good faith believed.
It should also be apparent that over-deterrence operates
mainly against legal rather than factual positions. There is of-
ten room for legitimate argument over what the law should be,
or what law should apply to a given set of facts. Consequently,
a lawyer often has considerable leeway in formulating his
client's legal position. In asserting his client's factual position,
by contrast, a lawyer is limited to the facts as he and his client
know them. He may argue what the facts are, but he can hard-
ly argue what the facts should be. As the lawyer generally has
no range of legitimate factual positions to assert, Rule 11 can-
not force him to narrow that range unduly.
To be sure, the advisory committee notes to the 1983
amendments caution that the Rule "is not intended to chill an
attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal
theories."4 9 But it is difficult to imagine that there are many
48. See authorities cited supra note 3; this topic is of concern to all of them.
49. FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee note (emphasis added). -
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"creative" factual theories lawyers should be encouraged to
assert. Indeed, the conjunction of the terms creative and factu-
al theory seems almost a euphemism for perjury.
1. Retarding the Development of the Law
An important ancillary effect of over-deterrence is calcifi-
cation of the law. Commentators have argued that Rule 11
serves to preserve the status quo by discouraging challenges to
precedent.50 Once again, both the reasonable inquiry re-
quirement and the prohibition against frivolous legal positions
are necessary ingredients in this problem. Challenges to prece-
dent are of course legal positions; such challenges would not
be discouraged if judges evaluated them under a bad-faith stan-
dard.
Moreover, concerns about Rule lI's effect on the develop-
ment of the law suggest that over-deterrence of factual posi-
tions, if it sometimes occurs, may have less broad effects than
over-deterrence of legal positions. A senseless precedent that is
artificially preserved may cause injustice to many litigants or
potential litigants; over-deterrence of a factual position is likely
to affect only the party to the case at hand.
B. Wrongful Imposition of Sanctions
The reasonble inquiry requirement and the prohibition
against frivolous legal positions also combine to cause injustice
to litigants in the form of sanctions wrongfully imposed. It is
by now painfully obvious that judges sanction legal positions
that are not truly frivolous, assuming, once again, that the
term "frivolous" has any meaning. Judges have sanctioned posi-
tions that were adopted on appeal;5 positions that had been
taken, or were being taken contemporaneously, by another
federal judge in the very same litigation;52 and positions that
50. See, e.g., LaFrance, supra note 3.
51. Trident Center v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins.-Co., 847 F.2d 564, 570 (9th
Cir. 1988); Kucel v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 813 F.2d 67, 74 (5th Cir. 1987).
These cases were noted in Joseph, Redrafting Rule 11, NAT'L L.J. at 12-13 n.5
(October 1, 1990).
52. In Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 775 F.2d
177 (7th Cir. 1985) [Colts Ill], the court sanctioned a position that had been sug-
gested in Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 733 
F.2d
484, 488 (7th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Colts I]. In Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research,
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were later to be adopted by the Supreme Court.53
It has been suggested that judges are:
more comfortable correcting a party's legal contentions
than they are in second-guessing what may be a materially
incorrect statement of fact. It is easier for courts to detect
errors in law, by referring to lawbooks, than to detect
misrepresentations of facts, which remain outside the
courtroom.5
This theory appears sensible. Imagine what a judge's atti-
tude would be if he could go back in time and observe the
facts of a case. He would likely develop a certain intolerance to
perceptions different than his own, even in situations where
his own perception happened to be faulty and the facts hap-
pened to be otherwise than as he saw them. Indeed, some
believe that egregious judicial errors as to legal frivolousness,
such as those adverted to above, are no accident; judges are
actually prone to sanction non-frivolous legal positions.55 In
any event, judges appear to have done a far worse job in apply-
ing the prohibition against frivolous legal arguments than in
applying the prohibition against positions not well grounded in
fact.
This disparity in the willingness of judges to award sanc-
tions - and hence in the tendency to award sanctions in error -
would not be so great were it not for the reasonable inquiry
requirement. Just as a judge cannot usually see the
non-documentary facts of a case, so he cannot see into a
lawyer's mind. Under a subjective standard, judges would not
be so eager to sanction legal positions with which they dis-
agree.
Inc., 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983), the panel majority sanctioned a position
approved by the dissenting judge. These cases are discussed in Stein, Rule 11 in
the Real World: How the Dynamics of Litigation Defeat the Putpose of Imposing Attorney
Fee Sanctions for the Assertion of Frivolous Legal Arguments, 132 F.R.D. 309, 323-26
(1990).
53. Peters v. Wilson Plastics, 38 F.E.P. 937 (N.D. III. 1985) (sanctions under
Title VII). This case is discussed in Stein, supra note 52, at 318.
54. Medina, Henifin & Cone, A Supplemental Analysis of Reported Decisions
Applying the 1983 Amendments to Rule 11, 16 and 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12, 13 (1985) at 12-13, quoted in Kassin, An Empirical Study of Rule 11
Sanctions 33 (Federal Judicial Center 1985).
55. Grosberg, supra note 3, at 606, 635 (1987); Stein, supra note 52, at
316-17.
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C. Use of Rule 11 as a Litigation Tactic
Closely related to the tendency of judges to go overboard
in sanctioning legal positions is the tendency of lawyers to
threaten and seek sanctions unjustifiably. As I have elsewhere
argued, lawyers face powerful incentives to invoke Rule 11
against legal arguments that are not frivolous, but danger-
ous.56 Consequently, they often invoke Rule 11 as a tactic, in
order to affect the outcome of a case on the merits.
Rule 11 is considerably less amenable to use as a litigation
tactic against factual positions than against legal positions. In
large part, this is because it is a less credible tactic. If a lawyer
who is threatened with sanctions has some testimony or evi-
dence to support a factual position, he can be fairly confident
that he or his client will not be sanctioned. Therefore, he is
unlikely to be swayed by the threat of sanctions. By contrast, if
a lawyer has authority or arguments to support a legal proposi-
tion, it is always possible that his authority will be distin-
guished and his arguments dismissed as frivolous.
Another reason why Rule 11 is less amenable to tactical
use against factual positions is that the lawyer considering such
us% will often have insufficient information. He will not know
exactly what evidence could be adduced in support of his
opponent's factual position, should he attack that position via
Rule 11. A lawyer who invokes Rule 11 against a factual po-
sition runs a greater risk of appearing foolish or even of being
sanctioned himself.
The credibility of a tactical invocation of Rule 11 depends
also, of course, on the reasonable inquiry requirement. Under
a bad-faith standard, a lawyer who truly believed in his position
would have little to fear when faced with the threat of sanc-
tions. Consequently, his opponent would have little reason to
manufacture such a threat.
D. Satellite Litigation
Another majpr criticism of Rule 11 - possibly the most
important criticism - is that the Rule causes expensive and
time-consuming "satellite litigation" over sanctions. This prob-
56. Stein, supra note 52, at 311-16.
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lem is related both to the undue willingness of judges to sanc-
tion legal positions and to the undue willingness of lawyers to
invoke Rule 11 as a litigation tactic.
Empirical studies have shown the problem of satellite
litigation to be more troubling than previously thought; they
have demonstrated that when both published and unpublished
opinions are considered, a relatively small percentage of Rule
11 motions are granted.57 If the results were otherwise and a
large percentage of Rule 11 motions were justifiably granted, it
might be easier to consider the resulting satellite litigation a
necessary evil. But the low success rate of Rule 11 motions
suggests that the time and resources consumed by these mo-
tions is not time well spent.5"
It cannot be said that satellite litigation, like over- deter-
rence, is a problem caused solely by the combination of the
reasonable inquiry requirement and the prohibition against
law-violations. Nevertheless, these two elements make the prob-
lem much worse than it otherwise would be. As noted above,
negligent law-violations are the most innocuous of all Rule 11
violations. Accordingly, the satellite litigation they engender is
less justified than other satellite litigation associated with Rule
11.
Moreover, I believe that motions alleging law-violations,
with no credible allegation of bad faith, constitute a majority
of all Rule 11 motions brought, but are granted at a much
lower rate than motions alleging fact-violations. Unfortunately,
this conclusion, which is largely based on my own litigation
experience and those of other litigators I know, cannot easily
be tested against currently available empirical studies.
Two valuable empirical studies, adverted to earlier, are the
Third Circuit Task Force Report 9 and a report of the New
York State Bar Association.6" Neither study yields a break-
57. Burbank, supra note 34, at 57 (13.6 percent granted); Repor of the Com-
mittee on Federal Courts, supra note 39, at A2 (27.2 percent granted); Nelken, supra
note 46, at 149 (maximum estimate of 25 percent granted, minimum estimate of
6.67 percent granted).
58. It might be argued that even Rule 11 motions that are denied serve some
deterrent purpose. It is more likely that they serve an over-deterrent purpose,
since they subject positions that should not be sanctioned to the threat of sanc-
tions.
59. Burbank, supra note 34.
60. COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 39.
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down of sanction motions according to the basis for sanctions
sought, although the Third Circuit Task Force did try to gather
such data.6
Empirical work should be conducted on the topical distri-
bution of Rule 11 motions. If such work supports the hypothe-
sis that the majority of Rule 11 motions allege a law-violation,
it would appear that such motions are responsible for most of
the satellite litigation engendered by Rule 11. A finding that
motions alleging a law-violation are granted at a lower rate
than motions alleging a fact-violation would suggest that the
satellite litigation engendered by allegations of law-violations is
doubly unjustified - both because. such violations tend to be
innocuous and because motions alleging such violations tend
not to be meritorious.
62
IV. CONCLUSION
The drafters of the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 made a
number of changes to the old Rule.
63 Of these changes, two
61. The questionnaires distributed to the court clerks specifically asked for
the grounds on which sanctions were sought. Burbank, supra note 34, at 120.
However, it appears that the vagueness of the motions filed and the clerks' unfa-
miliarity with the intricacies of the cases made it impossible to obtain a useful
breakdown.
62. How could one reconcile the hypothesized low success rate of law-based
motions with the greater willingness of judges, everything else being equal, to
grant such motions? The likely explanation would be that even though judges are
more willing to grant law-based motions - sometimes to the point of unseemly ea-
gerness - the great majority of law-based motions are so lacking in merit that they
are not granted.
63. Before the 1983 amendments, Rule 11 read, in part, as follows:
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed
by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose ad-
dress shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney
shall sign his pleading and state his address. Except when otherwise
specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified
or accompanied by affidavit . . . . The signature of an attorney con-
stitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the
best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground
to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is
not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule,
it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as
though the pleading had not been served. For a wilful violation of
this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary
action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter
is inserted.
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stand out as most significant: the imposition of a reasonable
inquiry requirement and the specification of attorney fees as
an available sanction. The reasonable inquiry requirement has
led to the evaluation of papers under an objective standard;
the mention of attorney fees has made them the sanction of
choice. A third change, not as momentous as the first two but
still important, was to make the imposition of some sanction
for a Rule violation mandatory, at least in theory.
One of the leading commentators on Rule 11, Professor
Melissa Nelken, has proposed that all reference to attorney
fees be deleted from the Rule, and that courts be directed,
through an advisory committee note, to impose an attorney fee
sanction only "in an extraordinary case."" Several advantages
would accrue from such a repeal of the second major change
wrought in 1983. The absence of routine fee-shifting would
make it less attractive forlawyers to file Rule 11 motions, thus
reducing satellite litigation. Overdeterrence would also be re-
duced, as lawyers would have less reason to fear that a crush-
ing attorney fee sanction would result from the assertion of
creative or challenging arguments.65
Professor Nelken's proposal would be an improvement
over the current Rule. Nevertheless, it has drawbacks. If
overdeterrence would be reduced by the elimination of routine
fee-shifting, so, inevitably, would proper deterrence. Moreover,
deterrence would be reduced for all Rule 11 violations more
or less equally - both those violations that merit the most con-
cern and those that merit the least.
The hierarchy of Rule 11 violations set forth above sug-
gests that instead of reducing deterrence for all violations, it
may be worthwhile to eliminate the prohibition against those
that are generally innocuous. Such a pruning of Rule 11 could
be accomplished by repealing the other major innovation in-
troduced in 1983, the imposition of a reasonable inquiry re-
quirement. A more conservative alternative would be to elimi-
nate the reasonable inquiry requirement only for law-viola-
tions.
As demonstrated above, the worst violations of Rule 11
64. Nelken, supra note 3, 41 HASTINGS L.J. at 407.
65. Nelken, supra note 3, 41 HASTINGS L.J. at 407 (proposed Advisory Com-
mittee note).
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are those that are committed in bad faith. The violations that
are least pernicious, and that least require the Rule's deterrent
force, are those that are committed through ignorance or
inadvertance. Least troubling of all are legally frivolous posi-
tions that are not asserted in bad faith.
Moreover, most of the major problems caused by the Rule
can be traced to the reasonable inquiry requirement, and spe-
cifically to the application of that requirement to law- viola-
tions. If there were no reasonable inquiry requirement, there
would be little or no overdeterrence; no explosion of satellite
litigation; little injustice from the wrongful imposition of sanc-
tions; and little use of Rule 11 as a litigation tactic. Such an
amelioration of the Rule's ill effects would occur even if the
reasonable inquiry requirement were eliminated only as to
law-violations.
It might be argued that the Rule prohibited only bad-faith
conduct until 1983, and that the drafters of the 1983 amend-
ments found this prohibition insufficient. However, a great
part of the purpose of the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 was to
deter specifically bad-faith conduct. This purpose is evident in
the repeated references to "abuse" in the advisory committee
notes:
Experience shows that in practice Rule 11 has not been
effective in deterring abuses.
Greater attention by the district courts to pleading and
motion abuses and the imposition of sanctions when ap-
propriate, should discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and
help to streamline the litigation process by lesscning frivo-
lous claims or defenses.'
It is now clear that as a result of the 1983 amendments to
Rule 11, other than the reasonable inquiry requirement, judges
are more willing to make an explicit finding of bad-faith con-
duct and to sanction such conduct. There are several likely
reasons for the increased enforcement of Rule 11 in cases
where an explicit finding of bad faith is made. First, the 1983
66. FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee note. Some would characterize
failure to make a reasonable inquiry as an "abuse." See, e.g., Schwarzer, supra note
3, 101 HARV. L. REV. at 1020-21. Whatever the merits of this view under 
the
current language of the Rule, it would seem inaccurate with respect to actions
taken or not taken before the Rule contained a reasonable inquiry requirement.
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amendments to Rule 11 have heightened awareness of various
sanctions provisions among lawyers and judges. Second, the
explicit provision for attorney fee awards in Rule 11 has given
lawyers more of an incentive to invoke that Rule against bad-
faith conduct. Third, the now-mandatory nature of sanctions
under Rule 11 has increased judicial willingness to impose
sanctions. All of these factors would remain in play even if a
finding of subjective bad-faith were once again necessary in
order to impose attorney fee sanctions under Rule 11.
There is after all no inherent barrier against determina-
tions that litigation conduct has been performed in bad faith.
Judges and juries make similar determinations all the time in
criminal cases, by inferring intent from conduct. It should be
easier to draw such an inference with regard to Rule 11 viola-
tions, as there is no requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.6
7
In any event, the 1983 amendments were an experiment.
The two major elements of this experiment were the broaden-
ing of the Rule's scope, through imposition of an objective
standard, and the strenthening of the Rule's deterrent force,
through reference to the attorney fee sanction. As the results
of the 1983 experiment have provoked considerable dissatisfac-
tion, it would seem reasonable to try a more limited experi-
ment, jettisoning one or the other of the two major innova-
tions introduced in 1983.
67. Obviously, some bad-faith violations would escape sanction if the reason-
able inquiry requirement were eliminated, but that seems a small price to pay.
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